of fiscal federalism. Unlike the earlier theory, SGT does not assume that public officials are benevolent actors who seek to maximise public interest (Weingast 2014) . Instead, it regards actors as having divergent goals. SGT, therefore, pays attention to the institutional incentives that induce or constrain the behaviour of officials as they interact within and across the tiers of government. One of its central claims is that intergovernmental transfers and bailouts encourage sub-national governments to spend freely and to offload the cost of their profligacy on the central government -actions which undermine macroeconomic stability. Consequently, SGT prescribes minimal intergovernmental transfers and a nobailout policy. In this paper, I evaluate the arguments of SGT in order to establish that: a) there is merit in the claim that intergovernmental transfers and bailouts foster a culture of over spending; b) the prescriptions of SGT, while reasonable in some respects, are fundamentally at odds with the peculiarities of a multinational federation founded on a fiscal regime of intergovernmental transfers; and, c) SGT theory is an attempt at reviving nineteenth century American fiscal federalism, and modelling it as a universal standard. I develop the above arguments by drawing on Nigerian fiscal federalism. There are good reasons for using Nigeria as a case study. Africa's oldest federation has a fiscal arrangement that is defined by intergovernmental transfer payments, which SGT considers to be soft budget constraints that breed sub-national fiscal indiscipline and prop up otherwise insolvent governments (Wildasin 1997; Rosas 2006) . Secondly, Nigeria experienced sharp declines in export revenues when oil prices collapsed in 2015. The decline significantly reduced monthly intergovernmental transfer payments, and threatened the functioning of state governments, plunging the country into a painful economic recession, and compelling the centre to provide three consecutive bailouts in 2015, 2016, and 2017 . Thirdly, Nigeria's public discourse is riven by clamours for what a wide spectrum of local actors refers to as "true federalism". Central to this call is the devolution of fiscal autonomy to the component states of the federation. The clamour for "true federalism" reflect the arguments of SGT for an ideal fiscal arrangement in which sub-national governments have autonomous taxing powers and each takes care of its own fiscal situation, without relying on intergovernmental transfers or bailouts. In this paper I intend to refute the notion that there is an ideal fiscal model for all federations to follow. The paper will proceed by firstly briefly defining SGT's normative arguments of fiscal federalism. The second section will discuss the fiscal architecture of Nigerian fiscal federalism (defined by central pooling and sharing of revenues) and the problems it generates. Next, the paper will use the data of the case study to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of SGT. The fourth section will discuss the dangers of generalising a particular model of fiscal federalism, showing that the theory is derived from 19 th century American fiscal federalism that has since collapsed. The paper ends with a conclusion.
Second-Generation Theory and Federal Bailouts
Contemporary theories of federal bailouts have their roots in FGT. They could best be regarded as a reaction to the latter's prescriptions regarding the assignment of functional and taxing powers to the orders of government and the resulting vertical imbalances.
In brief, FGT argued that, for reason of efficiency, higher tier governments should provide goods that are non-congestible, meaning those goods that a non-paying individual cannot be prevented from enjoying --e.g. national defence. Also for reason of efficiency, lower tier governments should have responsibilities over those goods that benefit local consumers, and which residents of their respective jurisdictions prefer, given that the tastes Further, FGT was concerned that horizontal jurisdictional differences in the taxation of mobile economic units would make for inefficiencies because the taxed units would relocate to areas with favourable tax jurisdictions. To head off the inefficiencies, the literature suggested that sub-national governments should avoid taxes that do not benefit mobile units; instead they should rely on benefit taxes while the centre should exercise authority over non-benefit taxes. Where there are significant regional economic disparities, the centre would provide equalisation payments to the have-not-jurisdictions so individuals in similar positions would have similar fiscal treatment regardless of their jurisdiction (Mieszkowski and Musgrave 1999; Oates 2004; Buchanan 1950) . On the whole, FGT prescribed functional and tax assignments between orders of government on the grounds of efficiency and macroeconomic stability. In cases of vertical fiscal imbalance and of horizontal economic disparities, the centre was required to make transfer payments.
Prescriptions for transfer payments have come under intense questioning by SGT.
While accepting the basic premise of FGT regarding the appropriate assignment of functional responsibilities, SGT charts a new direction by emphasising subnational governments' reliance on own resources for their functioning. It argues that horizontal competition between subnational governments can make for economic efficiency and prosperity, if the federal level refrains from interfering in these government's taxing and spending decisions. It regards federal fiscal interventions (equalisation payments, grants, bailouts, etc.) as distortionary policy instruments that inhibit the development of a competitive and efficient economy. The interventions are termed 'soft budget constraints' (SBC), which induce subnational governments to spend excessively, amass unsustainable deficits, and to perpetuate their dependence on the centre for more support (McKinnon and Nechyba 1997) . Kornai (1980; 1986) explained the concept of 'soft budget constraint' (SBC) to mean the practice whereby public enterprises perpetually posted losses and were always bailed out with state funds. Such enterprises operating at chronic losses could count on external assistance, an expectation that defined the behaviour of their top management.
The concept is applied to subnational governments (Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003) . that could prompt residents to migrate to fiscally sound jurisdictions (Rodden 2012). In contrast, rule-based institutional mechanisms are laws that prohibit deficits, severely limit borrowings, provide for credible no-bailout and minimal inter-governmental transfers, and allow for bankruptcy (Burret and Feld 2014; McKinnon and Nechyba 1997; Oates 2005; Skeel 2001; Ter-Minassian 1997) .
This HBC vision has been touted as a force for economic growth and prosperity. For example, McKinnon and Nechyba (1997: 46) 
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choices about their economic sustainability and the centre refrains from interfering in their affairs, as the source of prosperity not just in the United States but also in China. I examine the merits and demerits of these theoretical claims, and I begin by laying out the practical Nigerian experience with federal transfer payments.
The Fiscal Architecture of Nigerian Federalism
Nigerian fiscal architecture is characterised by legally mandated federal levying and collection of broad-based revenue. This fiscal arrangement assigns major revenue sources to the federal government, while subnational governments are left with inconsequential taxation jurisdictions.
I The taxation arrangement creates vertical imbalance, as the states own generated revenues do not match their constitutional responsibilities. Hence, in
Nigeria's fiscal architecture, subnational governments rely on tax revenues raised by the centre.
However, the major tax revenues generated by the centre belong to the entire federation and the constitution requires that they be lodged in a common account, the The FRA established the Commodity Reference Price for oil, meaning budgeted national revenue for each year would be based on a predetermined low price of oil. The difference between the actual market price and the low budgeted benchmark would be saved in a holding account, the Stabilisation Account (SA), in the Central Bank. The FRA specified limits on the federal government's deficit-GDP ratio at no more than 3% and required the President, on the approval of the National Assembly, to set limits on the consolidated debt of the federal and state governments. Furthermore, state governments can only obtain external loans through the federal government if their debt servicing does not exceed 40 per cent of their average monthly statutory allocations from the FA. The law authorised the federal government to deduct funds monthly and upfront from a debtor state's gross statutory allocations, with a view to servicing the state government's external loans. And, domestic borrowing by any state had to be authorised by law passed by the state legislature, with the proceeds strictly restricted to long term capital expenditure. Since the FRA could not be imposed on state governments, the latter were incentivised to adopt The FRA registered temporary gains. The use of the CRP in annual appropriations helped to slow the automatic pass-through of oil revenues for state spending. Oil proceeds were directed into the Stabilisation Account (SA, also referred to as the ECA) annually, the amount varying widely from year to year (Table 1 ). In addition, over twenty states enacted their own fiscal responsibility laws, and five established their own rainy-day reserve fund with the oil-rich Rivers State accumulating $343.7 million by 2014. The gains did not last.
The Problem of a Common Pool of Revenue:
In a context where the operations of all tiers of government are dependent on a common pool of revenue, there is no incentive to adhere to prudent fiscal rules that are personally disadvantageous. With the centre serving as a financial insurance company to the state governments, the latter constantly engaged in the same pattern of destructive fiscal conduct. According to an old government report, Nigerians regard allocations from the fiscal common as 'booty-sharing ' (Fed. Rep. of Nig. 1976: 10) . A more recent study has shown that in contemporary Nigeria it is disadvantageous for an official to be self-restrained or to invest in the public good when everyone else is raiding the commons (Olowu and Wunsch 2014). Over four decades since Peter Ekeh (1975: 100) developed the idea of the public realm as an 'amoral civic public from which one seeks to gain', state resources are still regarded as the spoils of war available for taking and one is considered a "sucker" for not "eating" up the state. Indeed, the concept of "eating" in African political discourse aptly expresses the opportunistic act of helping oneself to the resources of state and the irrelevance of laid down formal rules (Berman 2004) . This common pool problem constrains Nigerian state officials from committing to the fiscal responsibility laws they enacted.
For example, the majority of states that enacted fiscal responsibility laws did not establish the commissions required to implement and enforce these; this made the enacted laws redundant. Also, state governments that established reserve funds quickly depleted them even before oil prices began to decline. Furthermore, the ECA, that was supposed to serve as a rainy-day fund, was regularly drawn-down (Table 1) Given the states' unsustainable debt and lack of an independent revenue base, any significant decline in monthly federal transfer payments would impact negatively on their operations. Declines in transfer payment could truly cripple state governments, as recurrent expenditures consume over half of their revenues. As Table 2 
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The above case study data has implications for SGT as it helps to shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the theory.
The Strength of the Theory:
The primary claim of SGT is that transfer payments create a moral hazard as these are an incentive for subnational governments to continuously overfish the common pool of revenue. The Nigerian experience validates this claim.
Nigeria's state governments expand their expenditures by building heavy personnel and overhead obligations, operating persistent deficits, borrowing perennially from local banks and then calling regularly on the centre to divide up reserve funds in the ECA to cover these costs. Between 2009 and 2014, a total of $20.2 billion was taken out of the rainy-day fund (see Table 1 ). The draw-down occurred at a time when other oil producing countries E -234 the spending. Consequently, state governments do not have to engage themselves in the challenging task of sourcing local revenues. Indeed, following successive political restructurings of Nigeria from a regional to multi-state federation, there has been no deliberate and concerted effort by the states to expand their revenue base. Nigerian policy makers have, therefore, recognised the need to provide state governments with incentives to generate their own revenues. Hence, during the failed Second Republic (1979 Republic ( -1983 , independent revenue generation was built into a formula for the horizontal sharing of funds from the FA (Phillips 1991 ). Yet, there has been no remarkable improvement.
Throughout the 1970s transfers from the common pool accounted for 70-90% of the total revenues of the states (Phillips 1991) . Four decades on, the figures remain the same. As table 3 shows, only Lagos State generated over two-thirds of its revenue in 2015, largely due to its position as a financial and commercial city state. This city-state also generates 55% of Nigeria's VAT. The next best states were Enugu, Ogun, and Rivers which generated 53.1%, 50.1% and 43.6% of their revenues, respectively. The agrarian Jigawa State generated 5.4%, while the oil producing Akwa Ibom State generated 6.2%.
The states could intensify their revenue generation efforts to reduce their dependence on transfer payments, but only a very few have the industrial and commercial economic base to achieve such autonomy. For most of the states that are agrarian, with smallholder farmers a majority of their residents, not much can be generated through taxation. It would be futile to expect that taxing subsistence farmers would produce the desired result. Heavy taxation could even be counterproductive as the development literature of 1980s and 1990s has since established that the African economic stagnation of the last three decades of the 20 th century was on account of fiscal policies that overtaxed the agricultural sector and squeezed out farmers (World Bank 1994; Schiff 1992) . The agrarian economic orientation of majority of Nigerian states makes it difficult to suggest minimising federal transfer programmes or the prohibition of bailouts.
From the above it would be safe to state that there is merit in SGT's claim that intergovernmental transfers and bailouts create a moral hazards problem, but minimising intergovernmental transfers or prohibiting bailout is not feasible and might not be desirable as I detail below.
The Weaknesses of the Theory:
The Nigerian experience also helps to understand the problems with SGT. First, the theory views subnational governments as being fiscally profligate and of the centre as being the victims of manipulation. But the Nigerian experience shows that the centre is no less guilty. The federal government's recurrent expenditure is 71% of its total spending and the upper tier accounted for 80.13% of the $57.4 billion total debt owed to external and local creditors in 2016. Its deficits are modest (see Table 5 ), and differ little from those of the European Union; however, they are perennial, prompting the need for foreign loans to fund the country's annual budget. In 2017 the deficit was 2.2% of GDP and was financed through foreign loans. The centre is not as clean as the theory assumes. Thirdly, Nigeria's fiscal arrangement deliberately aims to avoid asymmetrical federalism.
The country's early federal compact was without sensitivity to equality in the size and population of the then regions, an insensitivity that ultimately led to the three-year Biafra secessionist war of 1967-70. Since the 1970s, the country's reinvented multistate federalism has incorporated constitutional rules for minimising deep disparities in the fiscal capacities of the constituent states, disparities that could have made few resource-endowed states economically powerful to the point of dominating the federation. Hence oil and gas revenues are distributed equitably across the country, a distribution that includes the creation of a special ministry for the oil producing region, the establishment of a commission dedicated to providing infrastructure in the region, and the earlier mentioned 13% derivation. Equitable redistribution makes for near-symmetry in fiscal strength, and also guarantees the social solidarity dimension of federalism, the 'idea that different parts, endowed with different fortunes and resources, are to share in a federal commonwealth' (Hueglin & Fenna 2006: 51) . SGT's arguments would be at odds with a commitment to social solidarity and nation building, given the theory's insistence on subnational fiscal autonomy, minimal transfer payments and a no-bailout policy. Such insistence would require that important taxing jurisdictions, especially oil and gas, be assigned to the states.
In fact, in contemporary Nigerian public discourse, there is a loud and sometimes threatening call for political restructuring that entails full fiscal autonomy for the states. In the view of some of the local actors pressuring for devolution, full fiscal autonomy would enable the federating units to develop according to their abilities, make for competition among the units, and enthrone "true federalism". The problem with this position is that full devolution might generate an unusual asymmetrical federalism in which the few oilproducing states possess enormous financial power and potentially act as creditors to the have-not states. Given the volatile ethnic relations in a country such as Nigeria, and the fact that the federation is of an ethno-federal type, the deep dichotomy of extremely rich versus poor constituent units could generate ethnic resentments that may lead to the untimely demise of the federation. 
The Problem of Idealising 19 th Century American Federalism
What emerges from the preceding discussion is the difficulty of generalising about federal institutions as SGT does. There is no such thing as ideal federalism, as Riker (1969: 146) noted several decades ago when he wrote that the concept is 'a constitutional legal fiction which can be given whatever content seems appropriate at the moment. Canada with its tempered individualism fits in between the two extremes. The arguments of SGT amount to disregarding realities on the ground for some abstract ideals. This runs counter to Riker's (1969: 146) counsel that it is best 'to go behind the fiction' of federalism 'to study the real forces in a political system.' Indeed, the Nigerian experience proved that real forces on ground matter, that they actually give content to the concept of federalism. 
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The ideas propagated by SGT turn out to be derived from a particular federation, the United States. In American federalism, equalisation (solidarity) transfers are non-existent and there was a credible federal commitment against bailout from the 1840s until the 20 th century. The theory extracted and glorified these features as models for the rest of the world, very much against Elazar's (1987: 61) SGT romanticises features that have disappeared from American federalism. This is reflected in Rodden (2012), Greve (2012; 2011) , and Skeel (2011) whose arguments for reviving and bolstering market discipline are rooted in nineteenth century US fiscal policy.
Changes in American federalism confirm the well-known idea that federalism is variable. It would, therefore, be a mistake to use a variant at a particular place in the past as a model for others. Like SGT advocates, contemporary Nigerian actors are guilty of this error when they press for "true federalism as practiced in the United States." 
Conclusion
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Federal transfers are the very foundation of some federations. This is the case with Nigeria's multistate federalism. It is also true of Canada that has the distinctive character of being a sharing and polite society partly on account of the institutionalisation of transfers since Confederation in 1867 (with equalisation payments formally worked out in 1957).
The same is true of culturally egalitarian Australia where transfers were initially designed at the commencement of the federation in 1901 for the political goal of maintaining the integrity of the country. SGT is somewhat blind to cultural and political differences across countries as it seeks to universalise a pre-New Deal rugged and highly aggressive American individualism. As the Nigerian case study data has shown, adopting the theory could bring some federations to their untimely demise. It is not surprising that no federation with a history of transfer payments has abandoned the arrangement, despite claims that the payments make for inefficiencies. The Australian system, highly criticised for being inefficient (Kirchner 2013) has undergone revisions but never abandoned. Admittedly, the case study showed that transfer payments give rise to fiscal indiscipline among public officials, but such a problem would simply mean that governments ought to align their expenditures with their revenues, instead of abandoning the arrangement as the SGT argues for.
 Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. I The centre is assigned with import, export, excise, mining (oil and gas), value added, and company, taxes while the subnational governments are left with property tax (which most of the states do not impose), motor vehicles licenses, land tax, entertainment tax, and market trading licences, among others. The only important revenue source assigned to the subnational governments is personal income tax, excluding tax imposed on personnel in the Foreign Service, military, police, and residents of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The tax assignment seems to reflect the ideas of the FGT. II The low figure for 2015 was partly on account of disruption in supplies by Niger delta militants and the dramatic fall in the international price of oil. III It should be noted that revenues from value added taxes (VAT) are required by law to be placed in a separate common account, VAT Account, in the Central Bank for sharing among the governments. IV The states' share of 26.72% is horizontally shared among all the thirty-six on the basis of several factors, namely: equality, population, landmass, terrain, internal revenue generation effort, and social development. The VAT Account is shared in the ratio of 15%, 50%, and 35% to the Federal, State, and Local Governments respectively. V The most affected were: Kaduna, Kwara, Plateau, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Yobe, Imo, Taraba, Kogi, Bauchi, Delta, Oyo, Nassarawa and Ogun states.
